Rethinking Libya’s Digital Governance Architecture

Libya stands today at a crucial inflexion point in its digital transformation journey. The current institutional landscape—characterised by fragmented authorities, overlapping responsibilities, and inconsistent coordination—has long hindered national progress in telecommunications, cybersecurity, data governance, and artificial intelligence. These challenges are clearly articulated in the restructuring proposal, which accurately diagnoses the systemic issues facing the sector. The proposal’s recognition of mandate overlap, weak institutional alignment, and policy fragmentation is correct and necessary. However, while the proposed solution represents an important attempt at reform, creating an additional high-level council—المجلس الأعلى للتحول الرقمي والتقنيات الناشئة—may unintentionally reinforce, rather than resolve, the very issues it seeks to fix.

Link to the proposed structure from here.

1. Adding a New Council Risks Reinforcing Fragmentation, Not Solving It

The proposed High Council is positioned as a central coordinating body. In theory, such councils are meant to harmonise the work of multiple agencies. Yet global experience shows that creating new coordination structures often has the opposite effect.

Studies in digital governance highlight that layered coordination bodies tend to create decision bottlenecks and institutional ambiguity, especially in governments where mandates are already fragmented (Dunleavy et al., 2006; OECD, 2018). Countries that adopted similar high-level councils without adjusting underlying mandates—such as early attempts in Jordan, Kenya, and parts of West Africa—found that councils became isolated hubs, disconnected from the day-to-day operations of the Prime Minister’s office and ministerial structures. Instead of harmonising decisions, they added new reporting requirements, slowed execution, and diluted accountability.

In Libya’s case, placing the High Council above three major digital agencies risks shifting critical decision-making away from the PM’s cabinet, isolating the work from executive authority rather than integrating it. This contradicts the core principle of successful digital transformation: strong central leadership from the executive, not parallel bodies.

2. The Real Issue: Mandates Are Not Clearly Defined

Academic research on e-government modernisation emphasises that the most successful reforms begin not with new structures, but with sharply defined mandates, clarified intersections, and legally codified collaboration mechanisms (UN DESA, 2022; OECD Digital Government Review, 2023).

The core challenges in Libya’s digital governance stem from:

  • Overlapping roles between the General Information Authority, Telecommunications Authority, National Cybersecurity Authority, and the AI program.

  • Undefined boundaries between data management and digital service delivery.

  • Multiple bodies claim roles in national cybersecurity readiness.

  • Ambiguous responsibilities for AI policy development, implementation, and oversight.

Creating a new council does not fix these overlaps, but clarifying mandates does.

Global models support this approach:

  • Estonia focuses on legal clarity and clear data ownership rules, not new high-level councils.

  • Singapore created GovTech by merging mandates, not layering structures.

  • UAE and Saudi Arabia emphasise ministerial-level leadership rather than supra-agency councils.

Thus, the Libyan context would benefit more from precise mandate delineation than new organisational layers.

3. The Case for a CIO or Minister of State for Digital Transformation

Rather than adding a new Council, a more agile, effective, and internationally validated approach is to establish a strong Chief Information Officer (CIO) or Minister of State for Digital Transformation directly within the Prime Minister’s cabinet.

Why this model works:

1. Direct alignment with the executive: Research shows that digital transformation succeeds when directly steered by executive authority (World Bank GovTech Maturity Index, 2022).

2. Streamlined decision-making: A CIO/State Minister cuts down hierarchical complexity and resolves inter-agency conflicts quickly.

3. Clear oversight of digital policy coherence: One office can harmonise the work of the three key agencies instead of delegating coordination to a council that risks becoming symbolic.

4. International precedent:

  • UK Government Digital Service (GDS) led by the Cabinet Office CIO.

  • U.S. Federal CIO in the Executive Office of the President.

  • Rwanda’s Minister for ICT & Innovation.

  • Saudi Ministry of Communications & IT (MCIT) centralises mandate clarity, not adding councils.

The CIO or State Minister model creates a direct, empowered bridge between the PM’s office and the digital agencies, ensuring policy coherence, rapid decision-making, and accountability.

4. The Roadmap Must Define How Agencies Interact With Ministries and Government IT Departments

One structural weakness in the proposal is the lack of a clear mechanism defining how the three restructured agencies will work with:

  • Sectoral ministries

  • Municipal authorities

  • Government IT departments

  • Independent agencies

  • National data and cybersecurity units across ministries

Digital transformation is inherently cross-sectoral. Without a clear operational model, each ministry risks continuing to build isolated digital systems that do not integrate with national platforms, reproducing the current fragmentation under a new institutional banner.

Academic literature consistently warns that digital transformation without interoperability governance leads to costly failures (European Commission Interoperability Framework, 2017; UN e-Government Survey, 2022). A sound roadmap must therefore include:

  • Vertical relations (agency → ministry)

  • Horizontal relations (agency ↔ agency)

  • Cross-sector integration standards

  • Interoperable data-sharing protocols

  • Unified digital architecture principles

  • Reporting and accountability channels

These elements are essential to prevent ministries from pursuing isolated digital agendas disconnected from national strategy.

5. A More Coherent, Evidence-Based Model for Libya

Based on the above, an improved governance structure for Libya could follow this logic:

A. Clarify the Mandates of the Three Key Agencies

The first foundational step is to resolve the mandate ambiguities that have historically fragmented Libya’s digital ecosystem. Academic literature consistently shows that institutional duplication is one of the primary causes of digital governance failure in developing and post-conflict states (Dunleavy et al., 2006; UN DESA, 2022). Libya’s current proposal acknowledges the overlapping functions, yet the remedy must focus on mandate precision, not new bodies. 

A coherent model for Libya would therefore define:

  • Telecommunications: purely regulatory.

  • Cybersecurity: independent national authority.

  • Data & AI Authority: national data governance + digital services + AI policies.

In this model, each agency’s boundaries are explicitly defined in law, minimising turf conflicts and enabling a stable, predictable digital governance environment.

B. Establish a CIO/State Minister for Digital Transformation

Global evidence consistently demonstrates that successful digital transformation depends on centralised executive leadership, not cross-agency councils (World Bank, 2022; OECD, 2023). For Libya, the most effective governance anchor would be the creation of a Chief Information Officer (CIO) for the State or Minister of State for Digital Transformation embedded within the PM’s cabinet.

Role and authority of the CIO/Minister:

  • Directly linked to the PM.

  • Lead national digital policy at the highest executive level.

  • Resolve inter-agency mandate conflicts rapidly.

  • Coordinate strategy execution across ministries.

  • Ensure alignment of all digital reforms with government priorities.

  • Drive national interoperability and data-sharing frameworks.

  • Oversee progress through direct reporting to the PM.

This model is in line with the UK’s Government Digital Service (GDS), the U.S. Federal CIO model, Rwanda’s ICT Ministry, Singapore’s GovTech leadership, and Saudi Arabia’s MCIT structure.

A CIO or State Minister provides Libya with a central brain for the digital ecosystem; something a new High Council would struggle to achieve effectively due to its advisory nature and distance from the PM's operational centre.

C. Create Legal Mechanisms for Inter-agency Coordination

Rather than establishing a new council, Libya should adopt codified, enforceable coordination mechanisms embedded in law and supported by digital architecture standards. These mechanisms include:

  • Inter-agency coordination protocols.

  • National interoperability framework.

  • Cross-government Digital Architecture Board.

  • Mandatory digital transformation units in ministries.

These mechanisms strengthen integration without creating additional bureaucracy.

D. Introduce a Comprehensive Government Interoperability Framework

So ministries do not build parallel or incompatible systems.

A digital transformation cannot succeed in isolation. It must be anchored in a whole-of-government approach. Libya’s roadmap should therefore define:

  • Vertical integration: How the central digital agencies work with ministries, regulators, and public institutions.

  • Horizontal integration: How ministries coordinate digital decisions (data, cybersecurity, AI, platforms) in a unified national framework.

  • Local integration: How municipalities and regional bodies implement and harmonise digital services.

  • External integration: How the ecosystem interacts with the Private sector, Academia, International partners and Civil society.

Without these relational definitions, ministries will continue building disconnected systems, perpetuating the fragmentation highlighted in the current plan.

E. Integrate Roadmap With the Entire Government Landscape

To ensure coherence, Libya needs a digital operating model that addresses:

  • Governance structures.

  • Decision rights.

  • Funding channels.

  • Digital service lifecycle management.

  • Shared platforms (digital ID, digital payments, data exchange layers).

  • Monitoring and accountability tools.

This approach aligns with the global consensus on digital governance reform: clarity, consolidation, and central executive leadership, not more layers.

Conclusion

Libya’s digital transformation requires a bold, evidence-based institutional redesign. The current proposal correctly identifies the structural challenges but does not fully resolve them. Adding a High Council risks duplicating coordination roles, distancing work from the Prime Minister’s cabinet, and perpetuating fragmentation.

A more effective path forward is grounded in academic evidence and international best practice: clarifying mandates, empowering a central CIO or State Minister, and defining clear operational relationships between agencies, ministries, and IT departments. This model offers Libya a realistic, efficient, and scalable governance framework capable of supporting secure, innovative, and unified national digital transformation.

Reference List

1. Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., & Tinkler, J. (2006). Digital Era Governance: IT Corporations, the State, and e-Government. Oxford University Press.

2. OECD (2018). Digital Government Review: Leveraging Digital Transformation for Better Public Services. OECD Publishing.

3. OECD (2023). OECD Digital Government Index & Digital Government Review. OECD Publishing.

4. UN DESA (2022). United Nations E-Government Survey 2022: The Future of Digital Government. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

5. UN DESA (2020–2023). Compendium of Digital Government Initiatives. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

6. World Bank (2022). GovTech Maturity Index (GTMI): A Global Framework for Digital Governance. Washington, DC: World Bank.

7. European Commission (2017). European Interoperability Framework (EIF) for Public Services. Publications Office of the European Union.

8. U.S. Executive Office of the President (2021). Federal CIO Role and Executive Digital Strategy. Office of Management and Budget.

9. Government Digital Service (GDS), UK Cabinet Office (2019). Digital, Data and Technology Function Operating Model.

10. Rwanda Ministry of ICT & Innovation (2020). National ICT Strategy and Policy.

11. Singapore GovTech (2018–2022). Digital Government Blueprint and Smart Nation Initiatives. Government Technology Agency of Singapore.

12. UAE Telecommunications and Digital Government Regulatory Authority (TDRA) (2022). Digital Government Strategy.

13. Saudi Arabia Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) (2021–2023). Digital Government Strategy & National Transformation Program.

14. Kenya ICT Authority (2019). Lessons from the National ICT Master Plan Implementation.

15. Jordan Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship (MoDEE) (2020). Digital Transformation Strategy 2020–2025.